The opening up of the UK residential electricity sector in 1999 prompted several studies of the impact this had on both the level and structuring of retail charges, and on incumbent players' market power. Drawing on observations of regional tariffs for the month of January 2004, this paper supports previous conclusions based on simulated retail charges, looking at the response of real tariffs to distribution and transmission costs, customer density, and the length of low voltage underground circuit. We also investigate whether vertically integrated suppliers have a particular effect on charges ceteris paribus the effect of cost drivers and supplier-related factors. The wave of mergers and acquisitions which followed raised concerns about the potential detrimental effect on end-customers. Although much research has been devoted to switching behaviour (Giulietti et al., 2006; Waterson, 2003; Ofgem, 2001 Ofgem, , 2002 Ofgem, , 2003 , third-degree price discrimination and incumbents' market power (Otero and Waddams Price, 2001 ), little information is available about the effect of ownership structures on tariffs.
Oligopoly models show that the proposition that a merger enables firms to exploit economies of scale is not convincing if the merger does not also generate technical synergies. These synergies would lead to lower charges to customers (Spector, 2003;  see also references herein). A study by Azzam and Rosebaum (2001) which considers the link between efficiency to concentration points out however that it is difficult to discriminate empirically between collusion and cost-efficiency as variables relating to price and profitability. The retail electricity market is a case in point, as high switching costs favour collusive behaviour, thus maintaining high prices.
Using 2002 price data Salies and Waddams Price (2004) examine similarities between the effects of brand coefficients on retail electricity prices within existing ownership groups but find that evidence of this is weak. Relying on tariffs levels from January 2004, the present paper contributes to the discussion by highlighting the effect of mergers on tariffs in a more efficient way. We test for the specific average effect of several ownership groups on regional electricity retail charges after F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 controlling for cost drivers, economies of scale and customer density. Particular attention is given to the effect of the creation of EDF Energy, the merged London Electricity and SEEBOARD group of companies. In broad terms, we conjecture that if technical synergies exist between distribution networks owned by EDF Energy (situated in contiguous regions: London, East and South-East England), they should result in lower prices. This paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the changes in ownership structures that occurred in the GB electricity sector between May 2002 and January 2004. We focus on the probable effect of these changes on the degree of competition and remaining incumbents' market power. We then introduce data, an econometric model and the hypotheses to be tested in section III. Results are given and discussed in section IV, before the conclusion in section V.
II. CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE
The ownership structure of each supplier is summarised in the following Association, 2003a, b) . At the intersection of any given row and column one can see whether a supplier (row) is an incumbent in the distribution region (column). A supplier may not be present in the selected region, as is the case for Basic Power. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The retail charges pertain to 14 regions, with up to eight brand names per region. We consider here a single payment method (standard credit) at three levels of consumption. The distribution charges were taken from distributors' published statements of charges for connection to and use of the distribution system (Ofgem, 2004) . Constituting 15-30% of a customer's final bill, these vary across the Table 2 .
[Insert Table 2] For each level of consumption q = 1650, 3300, and 4950 kWh, we estimate the following model: not exceeding one third, reflecting the shorter consumption period to which transmission charges correspond). We allow for both the number of customers and the distribution area using a ratio of the two. It is expected that denser (urbanised)
areas allow suppliers to reduce per-customer marketing costs for a given network size, which would be indicated by a negative value for 3 . The length of low voltage underground circuit is used as a proxy for the size of the network. Underground circuit length has a very close correlation to the number of distribution customers (the correlation coefficient equals 0.88). Its effect on charges shall be measured by we test the hypothesis of whether vertical integration has a relatively significant effect on charges using 6 . Unlike the previous study which relied on signs of the estimated coefficients on brand dummies, the present analysis shows some improvement as it statistically tests for the significance of group dummy coefficients; group dummies replace brand dummies. We note that our model may be seen as a constrained version of a model with brand dummies.
We have not included a constant; thus, no base group is considered. This allows us to avoid near-colinearity problems and vacuous interpretation of the constant.
Following the Salies and Waddams Price (2004) we estimated a two-equation seemingly unrelated regression equation (SURE) model for standard and direct debit tariffs. We only report results of the standard credit equation.
As there is a possibility of non-constant residual variance within each equation
resulting from the spatial dimension of our data, we tested for conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form within each equation using White's (1980) test. We reject homoskedasticity at the 5% level of significance in the direct debit equation at 1650kWh. We may interpret this result as a stronger attempt from supply businesses to differentiate their tariffs in this market. As will be shown later, this result shows regional incumbents still enjoy market power, particularly in the direct debit market where most switching has occurred. The model's coefficients are reported in Table 3 .
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
First we consider the responses of retail charges to distribution and transmission charges. As expected, the coefficient on distribution charges is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance. If we assume a 95% confidence interval centred about one, distribution costs are almost fully passed on to customers, except in the direct debit and prepayment equations at 1650kWh. With regard to transmission charges, our results are also similar to Salies and Waddams Price (2004), with a coefficient about one third due to the short consumption period to which these charges correspond (peak period from 16:00 to 19:00 hours). If in each equation at 3300kWh we multiply by three the estimated coefficient on the transmission variable then we obtain a value that ranges from about 0.7 to 0.8.
[Insert Table 3] We find economies of density at 1650 kWh and less significantly at 3300 kW.
Closely related, the negative impact on retail charges of the length of the underground circuit in all markets would reflect economies of scale: a customer's bill is lower in distribution regions that have more kilometres of circuit underground. The low significance of the coefficient applied to density might result from the excessive between the cheapest and the most expensive supplier. Note that these savings do not account for consumer perception of switching costs. This difference was highest in the direct debit market at 4950kWh (we do not report this result). Conversely, the effect of Innogy and Powergen groups on charges is greater or equal to the average effect. This seems consistent with integrated suppliers charging higher prices raising gives an advantage to older suppliers in the market (Farrell and Klemperer, 2004) . Ofgem (2003, p.38) reports that more households are switching to non-prepayment markets and low-income customers switch less often.
Interestingly, EDF Energy group has, on average, a lower impact on charges than SSE and Innogy. We suspect a more efficient vertically integrated structure and pricing strategy. Note that EDF Energy includes the Seeboard and Eastern distribution businesses that are in neighbouring regions. It is worth noting, as Spector (2003) emphasises, that the proposition that a merger allows firms to exploit economies of scale is not convincing if the merger does not also generate technical synergies, through learning for example. Technical synergies may exist between distribution networks owned by EDF Energy because they are in contiguous regions (London, the East and South East). In addition, EDF Energy holds generation assets, giving it the ability to bypass the volatile and often illiquid electricity exchanges in order to hedge its customer base.
SSE also seems efficient at low consumption levels compared with Powergen, Scottish Power, Innogy and British Gas, but overall less efficient than the EDF Energy group. Unlike this latter entity, SSE owns very distant networks, one in Scotland and the other in the South of England, which, in accordance with our previous discussion, would not favour technical synergies. Using regional observations on tariffs offered in December 2003, the present paper set out to investigate the particular effect of various integrated structures on the relationship between annual retail charges and cost drivers. We find evidence of different pricing strategies by the various ownership groups, which suggests that the effect on retail charges of integrated suppliers varies depending on the spatial dispersion of the merged networks.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall these results support Salies and Waddams Price (2003, 2004) who also pointed out the negative (respectively positive) effect on unit rates and bills of a change in the number of customers (respectively the distribution area). Our density variable, however, provides a more flexible interpretation as the particular influence on charges in rural (less dense) areas proves to be significant. Alongside this variable, the size of the underground network leads to a similar result as the number of customers: coefficient estimates range from -0.7 to -0.3. For example, if the underground circuit increases by 3,000 km, then retail charges would decrease by £1 in the standard credit market at 1,650kWh.
We could bring more information to the discussion by extending the range of consumption levels considered or using longitudinal data. This would have the further advantage of increasing the number of observations for brands such as Manweb, SWEB, Swalec, and Seeboard. Notes: standard errors in parentheses. '*' = significant at the 10% level. '**' = significant at the 5% level. '***' = significant at the 1% level. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
